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Abstract—In decision making a key source of uncertainty is
people’s perception of information which is influenced by their
attitudes toward risk. Both, perception of information and risk
attitude, affect the interpretation of information and hence the
choice of suitable courses of action in a variety of contexts ranging
from project planning to military operations. Visualization asso-
ciated with the dynamics of cognitive states of people processing
information and making decision is therefore not only important
for analysis but has also significant practical applications, in
particular in the military command and control domain. In
this paper, we focus on a major concept that affect human
cognition in this context: reliability of information. We introduce
Cognitive Move Diagrams (CMD)—a simple visualization tool—
to represent and evaluate the impact of this concept on decision
making. We demonstrate through both a hypothetical example
and a subject matter expert based experiment that CMD are
effective in visualizing, detecting and qualifying human biases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of cognition is concerned with mental contents and
the processes by which these contents are manipulated. A chal-
lenge facing the cognitive sciences is that most mental contents
and associated mental processes are invisible. Attempts are
thus being made to illuminate this black box of human mental
processes by way of statistical inferencing supported by data
from neuro-physiological monitoring.
Visualization is normally used to represent neuro-physiolo-
gical data such as signals of brain activity; data generated from
statistical analysis such as a scatter diagram with a line fit of
some stimuli categories and the selected action; or participant
data such as a graph of how a group of children organizes a
set of concepts. However, visualization has a lot more to offer
to the cognitive sciences. Simple visualization tools can pro-
vide powerful, self-explanatory messages during an analysis
phase. In this paper, our aim is to visually represent dynamic
cognitive elements, contents, and/or processes of a group. We
hence develop a type of diagrammatic representation that we
call Cognitive Move Diagrams (CMD).
II. COGNITIVE MOVE DIAGRAMS
Situational awareness is a cognitive process that char-
acterizes how, in a conscious manner, an agent translates
input information to an internal representation of context.
To facilitate the transmission of complex high-dimensional
information, e.g. in a military battle space, one can use a
Common Operating Picture (COP). Here, myriads of pieces of
sensor data are fused and get represented in a richer language
than that used to describe the raw information. This language
can be a visual representation of the situation, e.g. a map with
a heat diagram of activities; a graphical network with arcs
representing recorded communication among nodes (entities);
or a higher-order logic or a system of equations that derive
from the fused sensory information the trajectories of a group
of unmanned aerial vehicles. In short, a COP compresses the
sensory information to a representation of richer semantics that
can easily be communicated to a decision maker. CMD are in
effect COP of the dynamics of mental contents in a group.
They facilitate the understanding of how small changes—such
as introducing a new concept to a scenario/situation—affect
consent or dissent of a group with respect to the interpretation
of the situation. In some sense, CMD is a graphical repre-
sentation of the dynamics of the mental content of a group
as a function of physical and/or psychological stimuli/affects.
However, as will be illustrated in the remainder of this paper,
CMD can have a much wider application than that.
As mentioned above, researchers need to measure the inac-
cessible mental processes of interest through some proxies or
a set of dependent/outcome variables of an experiment or a
natural situation. Let us define the vector ~Ct = [~ct1, . . . , ~ctN ]
of outcome variables (vectors) about which we collected some
measurements ~V t at time t. These variables are proxies for
the concepts of interest. ~cti, i = 1, . . . , N is the vector
of outcome i and has dimension M , with M the number of
agents/humans. In other words, for each outcome variable, we
have readings for all M agents. ~V is a matrix of measurements
and has a dimension of M × K , with K the number of
independent variables used to manipulate the experimental
setup. Manipulation occurs through varying the experimental
conditions (i.e. scenarios) at different time steps t = 1, . . . , T ,
with T representing the number of times the scenarios change
in the whole experiment. The independent variables represent
the stimuli used to drive cognitive dynamics in the M different
agents.
We now introduce the following definitions:
• Agent Cognitive State (ACS) The cognitive state ~stj
for agent j at time t is defined by the outcome variable
measurement vector ~stj = [c
t
1j , . . . , c
t
Nj ].
• Agent Cognitive Move (ACM) When the measurement
vector for agent j changes because of a manipulation of
the scenario at time step t, the transition from the old
ACS, ~stj , to the new ACS, ~st+1j , is an ACM ∆~stj .
• Group Cognitive State (GCS) The cognitive state ~Stj for
a group of agents j = 1, . . . ,M at time t is defined by
a functional mapping from ACS to a matrix of similar
dimension, GCS : [~stj → ~Stj ]. An example of this
mapping can simply be a function that clusters the agents
together and replaces the value of each outcome variable
with a cluster variable (e.g. centroid). Therefore, agents
falling in the same cluster at time t will have identical
values; i.e., Stij = Stil if and only if both j and l fall
in the same cluster; that is, similar(j, l) = yes, where
similar is the similarity function used for the clustering.
• Group Cognitive Move (GCM) GCM ∆~St : ~St →
St+1; thus a GCM ∆~St is the transition from the GCS
at one time step to the next time step.
• A Cognitive Move Diagram (CMD) is a representation
of the state transition diagram of GCM using some
encoding scheme.
III. EXAMPLE
We illustrate the previous definitions in a hypothetical exam-
ple. This example deviates from our primary use of CMD, the
visualization of human biases related to information reliability
and temporal dependence of decision, so as to demonstrate that
the visualization can be generalized and of benefit to the wider
cognitive sciences literature.
In a military context, imagine we are interested to under-
stand the impact of weapons noise on memory. Let’s assume
M = 3 individuals participated in a within-group experiment.
Each experiment involved memory testing that was performed
on three days, each separated by a week. For each individual,
the sequence in which the experimental conditions varied was
chosen randomly. Twenty words and their meanings were
presented to the subjects in a random order. Two hours later,
they were first asked to recall as many words as they could.
They were then again presented with the same twenty words
and were asked to cluster them according to meaning. The
conditions on the test days varied such that on one of the
three days, the individuals were not exposed to weapons noise
within these two hours, on the other two days, the subject was
exposed to a one-hour and two-hour weapons noise during the
two hours between being told the words and being tested.
In this experiment, there is K = 1 ordinal independent
variable—the length of time during which a subject was
exposed to the sound of a gun fire, i.e. t ∈ {0, 1, 2} (hours).
N = 2 dependent variables were ratio measured: the per-
centage of words recalled and the percentage of successful
associations of words with concepts.
A. Outcome Variables and Measurements:
~C0 = [[0.20 0.25 0.45][0.50 0.50 0.70]]
~C1 = [[0.70 0.75 0.70][0.70 0.70 0.75]]
~C2 = [[0.25 0.50 0.75][1.00 0.60 0.55]]
~V 0 = [0 1 2]; ~V 1 = [0 1 2]; ~V 2 = [0 1 2]
B. Agent Cognitive States:
~s01 = [0.20 0.50]; ~s
0
2 = [0.25 0.50]; ~s
0
3 = [0.45 0.70]
~s11 = [0.70 0.70]; ~s
1
2 = [0.75 0.70]; ~s
1
3 = [0.70 0.75]
~s21 = [0.25 1.00]; ~s
2
2 = [0.50 0.60]; ~s
2
3 = [0.75 0.55]
C. Agent Cognitive Moves:
Agent 1 = [0.20 0.50]→ [0.70 0.70] and
[0.70 0.70]→ [0.25 1.00]
Agent 2 = [0.25 0.50]→ [0.75 0.70] and
[0.75 0.70]→ [0.50 0.60]
Agent 3 = [0.45 0.70]→ [0.70 0.75] and
[0.70 0.75]→ [0.75 0.55]
D. Group Cognitive Moves:
Assume we used some clustering algorithm for each
weapons noise exposure time interval. The algorithm for t = 0
assigned the first two agents to the same cluster with a centroid
of [0.23 0.50] and the third agent to one cluster described by
its original vector. For t = 1 all agents were in one and the
same cluster with a centroid of [0.72 0.72]. For the last time
interval, each agent occupied a different cluster. Therefore, the
GCS is as follows:
S01 = [0.23 0.50]; S
0
2 = [0.23 0.50]; S
0
3 = [0.45 0.70]
S11 = [0.72 0.72]; S
1
2 = [0.72 0.72]; S
1
3 = [0.72 0.72]
S21 = [0.25 1.00]; S
2
2 = [0.50 0.60]; S
2
3 = [0.75 0.55]
The clustering algorithm simply revealed that from a group
(similarity measure) perspective all agents were in approxi-
mately the same state when exposed to gun fire noise for an
hour. The GCM is as follows:
Agent 1 = [0.23 0.50]→ [0.72 0.72] and
[0.72 0.72]→ [0.25 1.00]
Agent 2 = [0.23 0.50]→ [0.72 0.72] and
[0.72 0.72]→ [0.50 0.60]
Agent 3 = [0.45 0.70]→ [0.72 0.72] and
[0.72 0.72]→ [0.75 0.55]
Fig. 1. CMD for the memory example using Encoding Scheme 1.
IV. ENCODING SCHEMES
We present three possible ways to represent GCM in a
CMD. The first encoding scheme relies on associating a unique
symbol to each cluster. In our hypothetical example, there
are seven possible unique clusters. Thus, we associate an
alphabetic letter to each cluster according to the following
rule: a cluster that contains only one of the three individuals
is marked by letter ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ for individual 1, 2, and
3, respectively. A cluster of two individuals is labelled ‘d’,
‘e’, or ‘f’ when containing individuals (1,2), (1,3), or (2,3),
respectively. When all individuals fall into a single cluster, it
is assigned the letter ‘g’. The resulting CMD is depicted in
Figure 1.
Encoding Scheme 1 has the advantage that participants
are uniquely associated with clusters. In its visualization, the
arrows that link clusters for different noise exposure times
offer both a glimpse of the dynamics of the GCS and the start
and end states. For instance, one can immediately see that
noise exposure over a period of one hour unified the group
memory ability. One can also make out clearly that the first
two individuals, despite starting with and maintaining similar
memory ability, diverged dramatically when exposed to two
hours of noise.
The disadvantage of Encoding Scheme 1 is that it does
not scale well as the number of individuals increases. When
numbers are large, it is better to label a cluster with the
number of individuals contained in it. While in this second
encoding scheme information about individuals gets lost, this
information is typically not very useful anyway when cohorts
are big. Figure 2 shows a CMD with Encoding Scheme 2. As
with Encoding Scheme 1 the cognitive changes of the group
of subjects exposed to different experimental conditions can
be grasped quickly.
If the number of GCM is very large, the transition lines will
clutter the diagram. Our third encoding scheme in Figure 3
uses colored boxes to represent clusters. Color intensity rep-
resents cluster size: the darker the color, the greater the number
of cluster members. The boundary line of a box encodes the
independent experimental variable: the thicker the line, the
larger is the independent variable.
Fig. 2. CMD for the memory example using Encoding Scheme 2.
Fig. 3. CMD for the memory example using Encoding Scheme 3.
V. SCALABILITY ISSUES
The visualization of GCM in CMD is restricted to two or
three dimensions. This is not necessarily a limitation in exper-
iments with small numbers of outcome variables. However, it
can become significant in our domain of application—military
information processing—where a primary objective is to have
a generic situational awareness visualization method that de-
picts deviations from expected cognitive moves in a group of
soldiers. As such, often tens of factors need to be analyzed
simultaneously and displayed to project a group’s behavior. In
this case, our recommendation is to group these factors and,
instead of visualizing the raw outcomes, use dimensionality
reduction techniques such as principal component analysis.
The visualization can then be done, for instance, for the first
two principal components only.
VI. CASE STUDY
In military command and control (C2), information relia-
bility can have a sizeable impact on the courses of action
taken. Not knowing how reliable information is, equates to
uncertainty. In the context of decision making such uncertainty
may affect the decision maker’s objectives. How much a
decision is affected is likely to depend on his or her attitude
to risk (the effect of uncertainty on objectives).
Obviously, there exists a need to quantify how risk attitude
affects decision making. The literature is replete with methods,
models, and studies for assessing risk attitude in humans. Risk
attitude has been assessed using games, such as the Angling
Risk Task [1], the Balloon Analog Risk Task [2], the Columbia
Card Task (CCT) [3], the Cups Task [4], and the Devil’s Task
(also known as Slovic’s Risk Task) [5]. However, these are
very specific games that situate players in specific, artificial
environments. Risk attitude though depends on context, in
particular in military C2. Similarly, there are many measures of
risk attitude, such as the Attitudes to Risk Taking [6], Domain
Specific Risk Attitude (DoSpeRT) [7] and the Risk Propensity
Scale also known as the Risk Taking Index [8], etc. These
measures are typically utilized in general risk assessments and
are rarely suited to military decision environments.
In a case study we posed the questions how much some-
one’s decision changes when they are told that the infor-
mation presented to them was reliable? If the concept of
information reliability did not cross their mind, how does
their behavior alter when they suddenly become aware of
it? How much does the framing of information reliability
affect their decision making? We phrased these questions in
the context of the strategic planning of truck allocations to
future operations. Decision makers (“agents”) were required
to make their allocation decisions three times where the
only factor that changed from experiment to experiment was
the framing of the information about the reliability of truck
demands. Specifically, in the first experiment scenarios were
described without making any reference to reliability of the
provided demand interval estimates; in the second experiment
information about maximum and minimum demands across
the various competing scenarios was described qualitatively
(e.g. “very high”); in the third experiment, the reliability of
information was quantified. The provided reliability estimates
constitute the manipulation variable discussed in Section I.
The experiment was set up such that resources provided to
participants were sufficient to meet the expected value of the
demand intervals. The AGS of the decision makers reflects
their deviation from expected value in the context of reliability
information.
Figure 4 shows a CMD for three participants of the case
study experiments with the outcome measurement variables
being the normalized truck allocations that participants made
in a given scenario and the deviation of their allocation from
the expected value. The application of clustering mappings
resulted in clusters of single individuals only, labelled ‘a’,
‘b’ and ‘c’ in Figure 4. From the CMD we can see at
a glimpse that, firstly, the introduction of the concept of
Information Reliability had an impact on all the decisions
made by the participant. Secondly, the graph indicates that the
group of participants does not have a shared understanding of
information reliability. For instance, the transition from State
‘a’ to another unique State ‘a’ is not shared by any other
participant.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced and developed Cogni-
tive Move Diagrams (CMD), adapted from some simple and
Fig. 4. CMD using Encoding Scheme 1 for the resource allocation problem
presented to three military subject matter experts.
general notions of individual and group cognitive states, and
transitions between these states. This technique for visualizing
cognitive similarities and differences is robust for use in a
range of experiments with varying manipulation variables. We
have presented an illustration of CMD applied to a hypothet-
ical case in which participants’ associative memory might be
affected by gun fire noise. We also presented results from a
real-world case study involving human participants. Here, the
effects of both the framing of information reliability and a
decision’s time horizon were studied in the context of strategic
defence procurement decision making. The simple hypothet-
ical example and the real-world case study demonstrate how
decision makers who reach conclusions independently of each
other, move through a cognitive space. We illustrated how
similarities and differences in cognitive perception can be
visualized in a CMD applying various encoding schemes.
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